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PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION AGAINST MUTUAL FUND
INVESTMENT ADVISERS: AMENDED SECTION 36
OF THE 1940 ACT
Mutual funds,' commonly promoted as a method for investors with
small amounts of capital to participate in the securities investment
markets, have experienced a period of dramatic growth during the
past twenty years. The net asset value of all mutual funds was ap-
proximately $4 billion at the end of 1952,- but had grown to nearly
$60 billion by 1970,' and was expected to reach $100 billion by the end
of another decade.' In 1970 mutual fund shareholders were estimated
to number almost 8.5 million.5 Extensive study during the past ten
years, however, has indicated that the financial growth and popular
acceptance of mutual funds has not been accompanied by adequate
regulatory improvements.' The initial regulatory scheme, the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act) , 7 did not provide sufficient
protection for shareholders against abuse by those persons exercising
actual control over the mutual funds. Spurred by the Securities and
Exchange Commission's (Commission's) recommendations in Public
Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth," Congress em-
barked upon a three-year effort to amend the 1940 Act.' The result
was the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970.0
1 Mutual fund is a common term denoting an open-end investment company as
defined by § 5(a) (1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940 Act), ch. 686,
tit. I, §5(a) (1), 54 Stat. 800. Mutual funds are companies that offer securities
representing a proportionate share of their investment portfolios and will redeem
outstanding shares at current net asset value. For more detailed descriptions of the
structure and nature of investment companies, see 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
144-46 (2d ed. 1961); SEcURITms & EXCHANGE COMM'N, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICA-
TIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
37-45 (1966) [hereinafter cited as POLICY REPORT].
2 POLIcY REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
3 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, MUTUAL FUND FACT Boox 78 (1970). Sales
of new shares, as opposed to market value appreciation of currently held assets, have
historically accounted for about 50% of the increase in asset value. See SECURITIES
& EXCHANGE COmm'N, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF THE SECURITIES MARKET, H.R.
Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 4, at 95 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL
STUDY].
4 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, ANNuAL REPORT 5 (1969).
5 N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1971, at 56, col. 4.6 See POLICY REPORT, supra note 1; SPECIAl, STUDY, supra note 3; WHARTON
SCHOOL OF FINANCE & COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS, H.R. REP. No. 2274,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) [hereinafter cited as WHARTON REPORT].
7 Ch. 686, tit. I, 54 Stat. 789.
s H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
9 See SENATE COMM. ON BAN-KING & CURRENCY, INVESTMENT COMPANY AMEND-
MENTs ACT OF 1969, S. REp. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 4 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as 1969 SENATE REPORT].
10 Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52
(1970)).
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One of the primary objectives of the new legislation is to facilitate
greater and more effective judicial relief against managerial abuse. 1
Former section 36 of the 1940 Act " articulated a standard of care
forbidding "gross misconduct or gross abuse of trust" and authorized
the Commission to seek specified injunctive relief in the event of a
breach of this duty.'3 The new law substituted section 36(a), which
restated old section 36 but changed the standard to forbid a "breach
of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct," " and added section
36(b), which created an unqualified "fiduciary duty" with respect to
compensation received by a mutual fund's investment adviser and made
a breach of this duty actionable by either the Commission or a security
owner of the mutual fund.'5 After a brief summary of the unique
"1 See 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 4.
12 Ch. 686, tit. I, § 36, 54 Stat. 841.
1Id.
14 Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 20, 84 Stat. 1428 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
35 (a) (1970)). Section 36(a) became effective immediately and provides that:
The Commission is authorized to bring an action in the proper district
court of the United States, or in the United States court of any territory or
other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, alleging that a
person serving or acting in one or more of the following capacities has
engaged within five years of the commencement of the action or is about to
engage in any act or practice constituting a breach of fiduciary duty involving
personal misconduct in respect of any registered investment company for
which such person so serves or acts-
(1) as officer, director, member of any advisory board, investment
adviser, or depositor; or
(2) as principal underwriter, if such registered company is an open-
end company, unit investment trust, or face-amount certificate company.
If such allegations are established, the court may enjoin such persons from
acting in any or all such capacities either permanently or temporarily and
award such injunctive or other relief against such person as may be reasonable
and appropriate in the circumstances, having due regard to the protection of
investors and to the effectuation of the policies declared in section 80a-1 (b)
of this title.
'5 Id. Section 36(b) will be effective on June 14, 1972, and provides, in pertinent
part, that:
For the purposes of this subsection, the investment adviser of a registered
investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to
the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature,
paid by such registered investment company, or by the security holders
thereof, to such investment adviser or any affiliated person of such investment
adviser. An action may be brought under this subsection by the Commission,
or by a security holder of such registered investment company on behalf of
such company, against such investment adviser, or any affiliated person of
such investment adviser, or any other person enumerated in subsection (a) of
this section who has a fiduciary duty concerning such compensation or pay-
ments, for breach of fiduciary duty in respect of such compensation or pay-
ments paid by such registered investment company or by the security holders
thereof to such investment adviser or person. With respect to any such action
the following provisions shall apply:
(1) It shall not be necessary to allege or prove that any defendant en-
gaged in personal misconduct, and the plaintiff shall have the burden of
proving a breach of fiduciary duty.
(2) In any such action approval by the board of directors of such invest-
ment company of such compensation or payments, or of contracts or other
arrangements providing for such compensation or payments, and ratification
or approval of such compensation or payments, or of contracts or other
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mutual fund characteristics that created the need for such regulation
and a survey of the nature and unsatisfactory results of prior share-
holder litigation against managerial abuse, this Comment will examine
the changes made in this regard by the Investment Company Amend-
ments Act of 1970.16 Specifically, this Comment will demonstrate that
by imposing fiduciary duties to the mutual fund upon the fund adviser,
Congress has provided the legal tools that will enable shareholders
themselves to more effectively combat instances of abuse of their
mutual funds, particularly those abuses stemming from the conflicts of
interest inherent in the current structure of the mutual fund industry.
I. MUTUAL FUND STRUCTURE AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Possibilities for managerial abuse of mutual funds are to a large
extent created by the unique structure of the funds themselves. In most
instances, mutual funds are created, managed, and their shares sold, by
separate, externally owned and operated entities called investment
advisers or mutual fund management companies.' Even within the
framework of the 1940 Act's provisions regarding shareholder and
director authority,"8 the wide diffusion of mutual fund shareholders and
the adviser's control of the proxy machinery give the investment adviser
effective control over managerial and investment policy.' Although a
mutual fund's assets may amount to millions of dollars, it is usually
almost totally dependent upon its adviser, since most of its officers and
many of its directors are associated with, employed by, or influenced
by, the investment adviser.20 The presence of independent directors 21
arrangements providing for such compensation or payments, by the share-
holders of such investment company, shall be given such consideration by the
court as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances.
(3) No such action shall be brought or maintained against any person
other than the recipient of such compensation or payments, and no damages
or other relief shall be granted against any person other than the recipient of
such compensation or payments. No award of damages shall be recoverable
for any period prior to one year before the action was instituted. Any award
of damages against such recipient shall be limited to the actual damages
resulting from the breach of fiduciary duty and shall in no event exceed the
amount of compensation or payments received from such investment company,
or the security holders thereof, by such recipient.
16 Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52
(1970)).
137 See Pocy REPORT, supra note 1, at 46.
18 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-13, -15, -16 (1970).
19 See WHARTO REPoRT, supra note 6, at 64.
20 POLICY REPORT, supra note 1, at 46. Typically, the adviser also furnishes the
clerical and administrative resources necessary for maintaining the fund, ranging from
portfolio selection to accounting services. See Note, Conflict of Interest in the
Allocation of Mutual Fund Brokerage Business, 80 YAE LJ. 372, 373-74 (1970).
Thus, "most funds are little more than pools of dollars, skeletons with few if any
employees other than officers and directors." Glazer, A Study of Mutual Fund
Complexes, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 205, 209 (1970) (footuote omitted).
21 Current § 10(a) of the 1940 Act, ch. 686, tit. I, § 10(a), 54 Stat. 806 (1940),
requires that at least 40% of a mutual fund's directors be persons who are not
"investment advisers of, affiliated persons of an investment adviser of, or officers or
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does not insure against abuse since these persons are themselves
designated by the affiliated directors and are dependent upon the adviser
for the statistical and accounting information they use to judge the
adviser.'
The existence of such a structure produces a conflict of interest
when matters affecting both the mutual fund and the investment adviser
must be resolved. Genuine arm's-length bargaining is difficult since the
mutual fund is represented by either those with a directly contrary
interest or persons influenced by them' The most obvious conflict-
of-interest situation is the negotiation of the investment adviser's fee.
Because the fund is so closely tied to the adviser, the directors do not
bargain in the market for advisory services. Therefore, although some
show of negotiation between the mutual fund and the adviser may
occur, normal competitive restraints on the fee are "conspicuous by their
absence," " and the terms of the advisory contract may be dictated by
the adviser.
The resulting advisory contract usually provides for a fee based
on a fixed percentage of the mutual fund's assets, normally 0.5 percent. 5
Although some funds now invoke a sliding scale when the total reaches
some specified level,26 the industry average is still approximately 0.47
employees of, such [mutual fund]." The effectiveness of this provision has been fre-
quently questioned. See, e.g., WHARTON REPORT, supra note 6, at 8 (§ 2(a) (3)'s
definition of affiliated person is narrow); University of Pennsylvania Law School,
Conference on Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 662, 739-40 (1967) (remarks of
Abraham Pomerantz). Usually, a majority of the directors will be unaffiliated, since
§ 10(b) (2) of the 1940 Act, ch. 686, § 10(b) (2), 54 Stat. 806, so requires when the
underwriting, or selling, function is contracted to a subsidiary of the investment adviser
and there are any common directors, officers, or employees between the mutual fund
and the underwriter. The underwriter is usually controlled by the investment adviser
so that such an overlap does occur. See POLIcY REPORT, supra note 1, at 54. Effec-
tive December 14, 1971, the term "affiliated person" in both § 10(a) and § 10(b) (2)
will be replaced by "interested person." 15 U.S.C. §§ 10(a), (b) (2) (1970). The
definition of an interested person is significantly broader than that of an affiliated
person. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2 (a) (3) (1970), with 1940 Act, ch. 686, tit. I,
§2(a) (3), 54 Stat. 791.
22 See POLICY REPORT, supra note 1, at 130-31.
23 "[Y]ou know and I know that if you are choosing an unaffiliated director or
an independent director you are not going to choose anybody who is going to be too
hard on you." University of Pennsylvania Law School, Conference on Mutual Funds,
115 U. PA. L. REv. 662, 739 (1967) (remarks of Abraham Pomerantz).24 Hearings on H.R. 11,995, S. 2224, H.R. 13,754, & H.R. 14,637 Before the
Subcoinin. on Commerce & Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign
Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 855 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 House
Hearings] (remarks of Commission Chairman Hamer Budge). Section 15 of the 1940
Act currently requires initial approval of an advisory contract by a majority of the
shareholders and renewal approval by either a shareholder majority or a majority of
the independent directors. 1940 Act, ch. 686, tit. I, §§ 15(a), (c), 54 Stat. 812, 813.
Effective December 14, 1971, § 15(c) will require approval by a majority of the
independent directors of both initial and renewal contracts and will impose a duty
on such directors to request and evaluate information germane to evaluating the
actual contract. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547,
§§8(c), 30(1), 84 Stat. 1420, 1436. Thus the directors may not escape the duty
to evaluate the advisory contract by delegating approval to the shareholders, a
practice widely regarded as meaningless. See PorCY REPORT, supra note 1, at 128-29.
25 PoLIcY REPORT, supra note 1, at 89.
2 6 Id.
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percent, 7 and so their impact has not been great. Such a fixed-rate
system, when coupled with the phenomenal growth of mutual funds, 8
has produced remarkably large advisory fees in recent years. Such fees
are potentially disturbing because "increases in the assets of a fund do
not lead to a commensurate increase in the cost of furnishing it with
investment advice and other managerial services." 29 The failure of the
mutual fund to receive the benefits of such economies of scale through
adjustment of advisory fees may be indicative of the failure of the
mutual fund's directors to negotiate the best possible advisory contract
terms, which in turn calls into question the propriety of the investment
adviser's role in the contract negotiations.
Other forms of adviser abuse that may not be adequately checked
because of this inherent conflict of interest and that are not subject to
specific regulation by the 1940 Act *° include sophisticated use of
brokerage commissions generated by the mutual fund's portfolio trans-
actions. The adviser's control of the mutual fund is commonly used to
direct purchase or sale orders to stockbrokers in a pattern designed to
benefit the investment adviser rather than the mutual fund. Such orders
may be used as a reward for research services provided to the adviser,
or for sales of shares of the mutual fund. The former benefits the
adviser because it need not incur research expenses itself; the latter
increases the fund's net asset value, and therefore the adviser's fee,
which is a percentage of that amount. Other opportunities for abuse
have been presented by the growth of mutual fund "complexes," in
which one investment adviser creates and operates several distinct
mutual funds. Under varied circumstances, the adviser may use its
control over all of the funds to favor one fund to the adviser's own
benefit." In short, the variety of techniques available to abuse the
mutual fund is limited only by the imagination of its investment adviser.
These possible managerial abuses did not elicit widespread concern
among private investors until the early 1960's, when numerous deriva-
271969 House Hearings, supra note 24, at 879-80.
28 Seetext accompanying notes 2, 3 supra.
29 PoLIcy REPORT, supra note 1, at 94. Documentation of such economies of
scale is presented in WHARTON REPORT, supra note 6, at 498-509; Hearings on HR.
9510 & H.R. 9511 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce & Finance of the House
Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 35-39
(1967). The failure to pass these savings on was a major factor for Congress:
"The principal problem arises from the economies of scale attributable to the dramatic
growth of funds and fund complexes, and the failure of some fund managers to share
the benefits of these economies adequately with the funds and their shareholders."
SENATE COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, INVESTMENT COMPANY AMENDMENTS ACT
OF 1968, S. REP. No. 1351, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968
SENATE REPORT].
30 Section 17, 15 U.S.C. §80a-17 (1970), deals with transactions such as loans
and purchases and sales of property involving a mutual fund and certain affiliated
persons.
31 See Glazer, supra note 20, at 226-33.
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tive suits were instituted attacking management fees as excessive.32
These shareholder suits were based upon alleged breaches of fiduciary
duties owed to the mutual fund by its directors and the investment
adviser under both state and federal law. The resulting litigation
demonstrated that neither body of law dealt adequately with the conflicts
of interest inherent in the mutual fund industry. In the words of the
Commission, "shareholder resort to the courts in connection with
advisory fees has been relatively ineffective in dealing with the divergent
interests of the externally managed mutual funds and their investment
advisers." 3'
Of the three fully litigated cases involving allegations of excessive
advisory fees, two of them were in the state courts.34  State law, how-
ever, was not designed to deal with the unusual need for shareholder
protection that results from mutual fund compensation of advisers, 5
and litigation in state courts has only buttressed the stability of large,
fixed-percentage management fees. Under many states' corporation
law, when a plaintiff attacks a contract or other arrangement as unfair
to the corporation because of director self-interest, easily obtained
shareholder ratification of the transaction limits the court's inquiry to
"whether the terms are so unequal as to amount to waste, or whether,
on the other hand, the question is such a close one as to call for the
exercise of what is commonly called 'business judgment.' " " This
principal was applied to the investment adviser compensation area in
Saxe v. Brady," in which the Delaware Court of Chancery held that a
management fee based on a flat 0.5 percent of the assets, worth up to
$590 million, "while large, [did not] warrant a finding of waste." 38
Such a specific "interpretation of applicable State law [made] obtaining
a favorable result [in subsequent litigation] . . . no easy matter." so
Suits brought in federal courts under the various sections of the
1940 Act before passage of the 1970 amendments were similarly unsuc-
32 See PoLIcy REPORT, supra note 1, at 132-33. A few successful suits were
brought by the Commission against types of abuse much more extreme than those
mentioned above, text accompanying notes 30, 31 supra. E.g., Aldred Inv. Trust v.
SEC, 151 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946).
33 POLICY REPORT, supra note 1, at 141.
34 Saxe v. Brady, 40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (Ch. 1962) ; Meiselman v.
Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, 170 A.2d 720 (Ch. 1961). The federal case was Acampora
v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963). The plaintiffs were unsuccessful in
all 3 cases.
35 See PoLicy REPORT, supra note 1, at 141.
36 Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 177, 179, 91 A.2d 57, 58
(Sup. Ct. 1952) (granting of stock options) ; see Eisenberg & Lehr, An Aspect of the
Emerging "Federal Corporation Law": Directorial Responsibility Under the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, 20 RUTGFRS L. REv. 181, 220-24 (1966).
37 40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (Ch. 1962).
38 Id. at 497, 184 A.2d at 616. The court did mention, however, that "[b]ased
on the 1959 and 1960 figures the profits [of the investment adviser] are certainly
approaching the point where they are outstripping any reasonable relationship to
expenses and effort even in a legal sense." Id.
39 PoLIcY REPORT, supra note 1, at 139.
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cessful. Acampora v. Birkland,4  the third of the fully litigated advisory
fee cases, involved director's duties under section 15 of the 1940 Act 4
and held, citing extensively to Saxe,4 2 that merely exceeding an industry
norm did not make investment advisory fees excessive. Other suits
were brought in reliance upon former section 36's creation of a Com-
mission right to sue to enjoin "gross misconduct or gross abuse of
trust." '3 In addition to the problems in establishing a private right of
action under that section,' the required proof of "gross abuse" was as
difficult as proof of waste,4" shackling plaintiffs with an almost insur-
mountable burden. And the Commission itself failed to bring many
section 36 suits in the compensation area because of a reluctance "to
stigmatize advisers with charges of 'gross abuse of trust' solely because
they have adhered to the traditional pattern of fee rates in the in-
dustry." " This feeling carried over into judicial attitudes toward
private suits and was undoubtedly fortified by the extreme nature of
the sanction: "the court shall enjoin such person [guilty of a gross
abuse of trust] from acting in such capacity or capacities either
permanently or for such period of time as it in its discretion shall deem
appropriate." 17
These inadequacies of federal law stemmed primarily from the
different nature of the mutual fund industry when the 1940 Act was
enacted. At that time, the industry was relatively small, and advisory
fees were not considered an area of primary concern.48  "[M]any of
the Act's provisions were specifically tailored to meet conditions and
practices prevalent in the investment company industry of a generation
ago. And, some of these provisions are not suited to contemporary
needs." " The inadequacy was particularly clear with respect to section
36, one of the "few elementary safeguards" thought sufficient in 1940,1°
but characterized by the Commission in 1966 as "[making for] un-
certainty and impair[ing] rather than strengthen[ing] the fiduciary
obligation of investment company managers to refrain from compensat-
ing themselves unfairly." "' In light of this conclusion, Congress under-
took to amend the 1940 Act to enable mutual fund shareholders to
protect themselves more effectively from abuse. One result of this
40220 F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963).
41 1940 Act, ch. 686, tit. I, § 15, 54 Stat. 812-13.
42220 F. Supp. at 548-49.
43 1940 Act, ch. 686, tit. I, § 36, 54 Stat. 841.
44 Discussed at notes 97-117 infra & accompanying text.
45 See Wymeersch, Some Aspects of Management Fees of Mutual Funds, 17
BUFFAO L. REv. 747, 787 (1968). But cf. Eisenberg & Lehr, supra note 36, at 264-65.
46 PoLicY REPR T, supra note 1, at 143.
471940 Act, ch. 686, tit. I, § 36, 54 Stat. 841.
48 See PoLicy REPORT, supra note 1, at 72.
49 Id. 71.
GO Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking &
Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 252 (1940) (statement of David Schenker,
Chief Counsel, Securities & Exchange Comm'n Investment Trust Study).
51 PoLIcy REPoRT, supra note 1, at 143.
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effort was sections 36(a) and 36(b) as enacted by the Investment
Company Amendments Act of 1970.52
II. SECTION 36(b)
Section 36(b) provides that the investment adviser of a mutual
fund has a "fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation
for services . . . paid by such [mutual fund] . . . to such investment
adviser or any affiliated person of such investment adviser." 13 But
section 36(b) has several provisions that limit the availability of
both the cause of action and the relief. Most important is the limitation
as to types of fiduciary breaches actionable. Only those that involve
compensation paid by the mutual fund to the adviser or an affiliate are
covered. Thus other sophisticated forms of self-dealing by the adviser,
that disadvantage the fund, 4 are immune. Another is a one year statute
of limitations imposed upon damage awards,5 which serves to limit
sharply the amount of excess compensation that may be recovered on
behalf of the mutual fund under the section. Also, relief of any kind
is available only against persons who have received the excess com-
pensation. 6 Lastly, the damages awarded may not exceed the actual
amount of compensation received by the defendant from the mutual
fund.
57
But within the confines of these provisions, there should be little
doubt as to what Congress intended to do by enacting section 36(b).
Despite numerous statements to the effect that no implications should
be drawn regarding present fee levels," Congress was concerned that
investment advisers were failing to pass on to their mutual funds the
benefits of economies of scale in fund operation and were immune from
attack because of the burdens traditionally imposed by state law." To
remedy this situation, Congress enacted a completely new Federal stat-
ute under which adviser compensation could be challenged. In order
to fully appreciate the nature and scope of the new standard of duty
imposed upon investment advisers in cases covered by section 36 (b), an
examination of the circuitous legislative history of the section is
necessary.
After evaluating the extensive studies on mutual funds,6° the
Commission made several proposals, which were introduced in 1967 as
5215 U.S.C. §80a-35 (1970).
531d. §80a-35(b).
54 See, e.g., Glazer, supra note 20, at 226-32.
55 "No award of damages shall be recoverable for any period prior to one year
before the action was instituted." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (b) (3) (1970).
56 1d.
57,Id.
58 See, e.g., 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 6: "This section [36(b)] .
should not be taken as reflecting any finding by the committee that the present industry
level of management fees . . . is too high."
59 See notes 35-39 supra & accompanying text.
60 See sources cited note 6 supra.
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S. 1659.1 Among other changes, S. 1659 would have amended section
15 of the 1940 Act to provide that: "All compensation for services to
a [mutual fund] . . received by an investment adviser, officer,
director . . . shall be reasonable," ' and to impose upon the directors
of a mutual fund, the duty to request and evaluate "such information
as may be reasonably necessary to determine the reasonableness of
compensation . . . ." I A non-exhaustive list of factors to be con-
sidered was given, including the nature, extent, and quality of the
services provided, the existence of economies of scale, all other benefits
directly or indirectly received by the adviser, and "[s] uch other factors
as are appropriate and material." O After hearings and floor debates,
the bill was passed by the Senate as S. 3724,66 but died in the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
6 7
S. 34,"8 identical to S. 3724, was introduced in the next session of
Congress. At this time, the reasonableness standard came under
vigorous attack by the mutual fund industry.' One objection was that
the standard was too vague and so would result in lengthy and expensive
shareholder litigation, as well as give the Commission coercive rate-
making power." But the key objection appears to have been that by
placing the reasonableness standard in section 15 of the 1940 Act, the
main focus would be on the directors of the mutual fund rather than
on the investment adviser itself:
Both we [the Commission staff] and the Investment
Company Institute agreed at our discussions prior to enact-
ment of [S. 2224 71] . . . that this was wrong, that the
directors should not be placed on trial, they should not have
to defend themselves.
61 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Identical proposals were introduced in the
House of Representatives. H.R. 9510 & H.R. 9511, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
6215 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1970).
83 S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d) (1967).
64Id. §8(c).
5id. §8(d).
66 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). The list of specific factors had been deleted
because "the wide variety of factors makes it very difficult to specify the most relevant
factors outside the context of a given case." Rottenberg, Developing Limits on
Compensation of Mutual Fund Advisers, 7 HARV. J. LEGis. 309, 334 (1970).
6 Rottenberg, supra note 66, at 337.
68 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
60 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 34 & S. 296 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking
& Currency 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 88-90 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 Senate
Hearings] (Statement of Robert Augenblick, President, Investment Company Insti-
tute). The objections to the reasonableness criteria by various interests are collected
and categorized by Rottenberg, supra note 66, at 337-43.
70 See 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 69, at 88 (Statement of Robert Augen-
blick, President, Investment Company Institute).
71 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). S. 2224 was the compromise bill that substi-
tuted §36(b), 15 U.S.C. §80a-35(b) (1970), for the reasonableness test originally
suggested for § 15.
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What should be determined is whether or not the adviser,
himself, in fixing his fee has complied with his fiduciary
duties. 2
The impasse between the industry representatives and the Commission
was solved by introducing a compromise bill, S. 2224, which would add
present section 36(b) to the 1940 Act,7 and which in all respects
relevant here is identical to H.R. 17,333,'7 the bill that became the
Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970.'
This explanation why the proposed amendment of section 15 was
replaced with section 36(b) suggests strongly that the reasonableness
criterion was to be central to any determination whether the fiduciary
standard had been breached. The Commission said that motivation
for the change in the manner in which advisory fees were to be more
closely scrutinized came from the mutual fund industry:
The change in language from unreasonableness to breach
of fiduciary duty with respect to management fee compensation
was made at the request of the industry . . . . [Placing t]he
reasonableness standard [in section 15] was not agreeable to
the [Investment Company Institute], although they did not
object to the proposition that management fees should be
reasonable . . .76
The Commission asserted that the adviser and the directors had always
had fiduciary duties to the mutual fund, but that the amendment would
eliminate the effects of the gross-abuse-of-trust test and focus attention
on whether in dealing with the mutual fund the adviser had treated it
fairly. The Commission concluded that the net result of all the
negotiations and maneuvering after introduction of the reasonableness
standard was "primarily procedural not substantive. It [the fiduciary
duty standard] was designed to assure reasonable fees just as the
original language of S. 34 was meant to do." "7
The mutual fund industry appears to have acquiesced, albeit
grudgingly,' in the Commission's analysis of the meaning of the new
721969 House Hearings, supra note 24, at 184 (Statement of Philip Loomis,
Commission General Counsel).
73 S. 2224, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 20 (1969).
74 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
75 Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413.
76 1969 House Hearings, supra note 24, at 188 (Memorandum of the Commission
in Response to Query by Chairman Moss Regarding the Differences Between the
Reasonableness in S. 34 and the "Breach of Fiduciary Duty" Standard of S. 2224
and H.R. 11,995 With Respect to Management Fees) (emphasis added).
77 Id. 190; see 115 CONG. REc. 13,699 (1969) (remarks of Senator Percy):
[A] new test for determining whether management fees are reasonable
has been devised. The proposed legislation [S. 2224] . . . holds that a
mutual fund investment adviser has a specific fiduciary duty in respect to
management fee compensation.
78 1969 House Hearings, supra note 24, at 429 (Statement of Robert Augenblick,
President, Investment Company Institute):
[Vo1.120:143
LIABILITY OF MUTUAL FUND ADVISERS
standard. In a memorandum submitted to Representative John Moss
during the 1969 House Hearings on the meaning of the terms reason-
ableness and fiduciary duty, the Investment Company Institute, the
mutual fund trade association, was preoccupied mainly with showing
that the investment adviser would still be able to negotiate the fee with
the mutual fund and be entitled to a profit."9 The memorandum stated
that their main objection to the former standard "was that in applying
the 'reasonable' standard the courts might feel called upon to substitute
their business judgment for that of the directors of the fund." so
Congress made one other provision in section 36(b) that conforms
to an intention to make a marked change in the traditional concepts
applied to advisory fee challenges. Section 36(b) (2) provides that
approval of the management fee contract by the board of directors and
ratification by the shareholders "shall be given such consideration by
the court as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances." sI Al-
though if considered alone this might be a meaningless diractive,8" the
legislative history indicates that the purpose of this provision is to in-
sure that
upon a challenge in court to compensation or payments, the
ultimate test, even if the compensation or payments z.re ap-
proved by the directors and stockholders, will not be whether
it involves a "waste" of corporate assets but will be whether
the investment adviser has fulfilled his fiduciary duty to the
mutual fund shareholders in determining the fee.S3
Such statements must be considered in light of Congress' awareness of
the results of shareholder suits under state law, as typified by Saxe v.
Brady,s4 and the relative ease with which shareholder approval can be
To those who have watched the course of these bills, it must be obvious
that our understanding with the SEC that we would not object to the
[fiduciary duty standard] . . . was reached without any enthusiasm on our
part ....
79 Id. 441 (Letter from Robert Augenblick, President, Investment Company Insti-
tute, to Representative John Moss, Chairman, Subcomm. on Commerce & Finance of
the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce). Inasmuch as the letter was
in response to a Committee question propounded on the day after the Commission's
analysis was presented, see text accompanying notes 76, 77 supra, if there was any
substantial disagreement with the Commission, it presumably would have been articu-
lated at that time. This exchange of letters should also make clear that the use of
the term fiduciary duty does not mean that the investment adviser must totally
abstain from profiting in his dealings with the fund. Rather, the term connotes an
obligation to treat the fund "fairly." See 1969 House Hearings, supra note 24, at
187 (Statements of Philip Loomis, Commission General Counsel).
801969 House Hearings, supra note 24, at 187.
8115 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (b) (2) (1970).
82 One might argue that courts should look to state law in deciding the appro-
priate weight, since a clear standard will probably have evolved. But this would
usually mean a waste standard and be clearly contrary to the legislative intent.
8 3 HousE CoMm. oN INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, INVESTMENT COMPANY
AMENDMENTS AcT OF 1970, H.R. REP. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as 1970 HousE REPORT].
84 40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (Ch. 1962), discussed at text accompanying notes
35-39 supra.
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obtained." Congress wished to ensure that the changes made in section
15 86 to impose greater duties upon directors in evaluating investment
advisory contracts would not bring a court to conclude that approval by
the directors or ratification by the shareholders precluded an inquiry
into the reasonableness of the investment adviser's compensation. To
conclude otherwise would mean in effect that those benefits Congress
had given by creating a specific federal standard were taken away by
incorporating a waste standard in the new federal statute, a rule Con-
gress found counterproductive in state law. Although it is beyond the
scope of this Comment to analyze exhaustively the considerations to be
taken into account by a court deciding a section 36(b) case in which
shareholder ratification has been obtained, the legislative history affirma-
tively indicates that the courts are to be the ultimate deciders of the
reasonableness of the advisory fee.
Thus, resolution of a suit under section 36(b) alleging breach of
fiduciary duty with respect to compensation will necessitate an inquiry
into whether the fee charged by the adviser was reasonable. 7 When
asked by Representative Hastings Keith what criteria would be used to
determine whether a breach of fiduciary duty had occurred, Commission
Chairman Hamer Budge referred specifically to the factors enumerated
in S. 1659 88 designed to delineate reasonableness, saying that the
"shift did not. . . change the substance of the standard." 80 At a mini-
mum, enactment of section 36(b) and litigation of several cases under
it should result in a notable downward adjustment of advisory fees by
the adviser, just as resulted from publication of the Wharton Report."'
Beyond that, section 36 (b), and amended section 15 (c), which imposes
on mutual fund directors a duty to evaluate the advisory contract,"' to-
gether may result in investment advisory fees that more clearly reflect
the value of the services rendered, because they are no longer set by the
investment adviser.
III. SECTION 36(a)
Although the enactment of section 36(b) attracted more attention,
the change made in old section 36 also has the potential to foster great
85 See notes 19-22 supra & accompanying text.
86 See note 24 supra.
87 See Freedman & Rosenblatt, Duties to Mutual Funds, 4 REv. SEc. REG. 937,
939-40 (1971). But cf. Rottenberg, supra note 66, at 351-53. The author, asserting
that the consequences of the change in standard "are most difficult to assess," suggests
mainly psychological motivations, saying that just as the gross abuse of trust standard
inhibited courts under old § 36, a court is less likely to find that an adviser breached
his fiduciary duty than that the fee was- not reasonable. With regard to the impact
of alleging a breach of fiduciary duty, see 1969 SENATE REPoRr, supra note 9, at
16-17 (Policy Statement of the Commission, May 14, 1969).
88 See text accompanying note 65 supra.
89 1969 House Hearings, supra note 24, at 200 (Answers to Questions Proposed
by Representative Hastings Keith in His Letter of November 12, 1969, to the
Chairman).
90 See Poucy REPORT, supra note 1, at 89.
91 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (c) (1970) ; see note 24 supra.
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change in the mutual fund industry. Section 36(a) does not contain
restrictive provisions similar to those in section 36(b).92 The scope of
coverage is much broader, authorizing the Commission to institute suits
in instances of "a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal miscon-
duct," 13 and encompassing both past violations within five years of
commencement of the suit and prospective breaches of the fiduciary
duty."4 If an implied right of action is recognized under section 36(a),
mutual fund shareholders will have a weapon with which to attack a
wider range of fund abuse by the investment adviser.' 5 Abuses caused
by the inherent conflicts of interest in the mutual fund industry, such as
misuse of mutual fund brokerage, will be subject to much more effective
attack than under former section 36 or under state law waste concepts. 90
A. Existence of an Implied Private Right of Action
Former section 36, predecessor to present section 36(a), has been
read by several courts to imply a private right of action for mutual fund
shareholders. Brown v. Bullock 's is frequently cited for the existence
of the private right of action, since it was the seminal case and contained
an extensive review of the legislative history of section 36." The court
reasoned that section 36 contained a "reservoir of fiduciary obliga-
tions" '00 designed to protect mutual fund shareholders from the many
subtle abuses that were not separately defined in the statute, such as
"those that might arise from a director's representation of conflicting
interests or from his lack of independence resulting in the subordination
92 See notes 54-57 supra & accompanying text.
9315 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (a) (1970).
94Id.
95 To the extent they are hampered by § 36(b)'s restrictive provisions, see notes
54-57 supra & accompanying text, shareholders may attempt to bring suits under
§ 36(a) for excessive compensation. Such an argument would not be totally ground-
less. Although various provisions of both the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§77a-aa (1970), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§78a to hh-1
(1970), make specified behavior actionable with similar restrictive provisions, plain-
tiffs have been allowed to proceed under the generally more favorable relief allowed
by an implied right of action under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(1970). See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). But such a develop-
ment is distinguishable from the § 36 inquiry in light of the specific attention given
by Congress to amending §36, and a more likely interpretation is that §36(b) is
the exclusive remedy for alleged excessive compensation.
98 Conflict, the resolution of which is beyond the scope of this examination, will
undoubtedly occur over the meaning of the term "compensation" as used in §36(b).
Allocation of mutual fund brokerage to benefit the adviser is arguably compensation,
since the net result is to reduce adviser expenses or increase adviser income.
97 Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971), petition for cert. filed sub nor.
Johnson v. Moses, 40 U.S.L.W. 3095 (U.S. Sept. 1, 1971) (No. 319); Tanzer v.
Huffines, 314 F. Supp. 189 (D. Del. 1970); Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961). But see Brouk v.
Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 366 U.S. 958 (1961),
vacated as mhoot upon settlement, 369 U.S. 424 (1962).
98 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir.
1961).
99 Id. at 238-46 & n.1.
100 Id. at 239 n.1.
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of the stockholders' interest to that of the management .... ," 101
Federal district court judge Herlands rejected the view that only the
Commission could enforce these obligations, concluding that "[i]mplied
rights of action are not contingent upon statutory language which
affirmatively indicates that they are intended. On the contrary, they
are implied unless the legislation evidences a contrary intention." 102
In the sole contradictory case, Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc.,1" 3
the Eighth Circuit denied the existence under section 36 of any implied
liability of mutual fund directors, reasoning that the failure of Congress
to provide for any private remedies in the Investment Company Act
was "persuasive that the omission was deliberate." 10' But "[t]he
decided weight of authority is contrary to Brouk . ... " ' In
Esplin v. Hirschi,°6 the Tenth Circuit held "that although the Invest-
ment Company Act makes no specific provision for private civil liability
arising from the violations of the Act such liability may be implied." 107
The Fifth Circuit in Herpich v. Wallace 108 assumed, while dismissing
the complaint for lack of standing, that "the Investment Company Act
affords a private right of action for injury suffered from its violation
... .)Y109 Even the Eighth Circuit itself has questioned the continued
validity of Brouk, saying: "In light of the developments of the law, the
time may soon arrive when we should reexamine [the Brouk decision]
... . [T]he strong indications are, that if given the opportunity,
the Supreme Court would also find an implied civil liability in the
Investment Company Act and thereby overrule our opinion in
Brouk." 110 The nature of the policy underlying the recognition of
implied rights of action under the federal securities law definitely sup-
ports the recognition of such a right of action under section 36. In J.1.
Case v. Borak,"' holding that there is a private right of action under
section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,112 the Supreme
Court reasoned that private enforcement of the proxy rules provides "a
101 Id. at 238-39 n.1.
10. Id. at 224.
103 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 366 U.S. 958 (1961), vacated as moot
upon settlement, 369 U.S. 424 (1962).
104 Id. at 912.
105 5 L. Loss, SzctulTiEs REGULATION 2895 (2d ed. 1969); see id. 2897: "The
Eighth Circuit . . . stands alone in its reading of the Investment Company Act to
exclude any possibility of implied liability."
106 402 F2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969).
107 Id. at 103.
108 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970).
109 Id. at 815.
110 Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 793 (8th Cir. 1967). Com-
pare Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir 1966) with Howard v. Furst,
238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (19Y7). For a compendium
of cases recognizing an implied private right of action under various sections of the
1940 Act, see 5 L. Loss, SEcutmrrS REGULATION 2900-02 (2d ed. 1969).
111377 U.S. 426 (1964).
11215 U.S.C. §78n(a) (1970).
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necessary supplement to Commission action." 113 Especially in light
of the apparent reluctance of the Commission to bring section 36 suits
other than against extreme instances of abuse,- 4 this portion of the
Borak rationale supports a similar rule in cases involving section 36.
The most recent case to recognize an implied right of action under
old section 36 is M1oses v. Burain."5 brought by a shareholder of a
mutual fund agams-ttfie fund's adviser, alleging a gross abuse of trust
in the failure to advise the unaffiliated directors of potential methods
of recapturing fund-incurred brokerage commissions." 6 Relying on
Bullock and Borak, the court held "that the purpose underlying section
36 included protection of shareholders against self dealing by the
managers. . . . This can best be accomplished if recourse to the
courts is available to private parties who have been thus wronged, as
well as to the SEC." 117 Therefore, the existence of an implied private
right of action under former section 36, while not considered by the
Supreme Court, seems to have been firmly established in the law.
The continued existence of a private right of action under new
section 36(a) would thus seem assured, other than for the enactment
of section 36(b)'s private right of action in cases of excess compensa-
tion. The language of section 36(a) is substantially identical to that
of former section 36, other than changes made to effectuate the new
standard of fiduciary duty and the greater flexibility given to judges
in fashioning relief."" Thus the legislative purpose behind section 36
of protecting mutual fund shareholders against adviser abuse remains
the same, if not reinforced, after the amendments, and private suits
are just as necessary and appropriate as an enforcement technique.
13 377 U.S. at 432.
314 See text accompanying note 46 supra.
11 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971), petition for cert. filed sub nora. Johnson v.
Moses, 40 U.S.L.W. 3095 (U.S. Sept. 1, 1971) (No. 319).
316 Due to the volume of their security trading, mutual funds incur substantial
brokerage commission costs. Recapture refers to various techniques to effectively
reduce the net cost, such as creating or acquiring a stock brokerage house as a
subsidiary. See Miller & Carlson, Recapture of Brokerage Commissions by Mutual
Funds, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 35, 55-71 (1971).
117 445 F.2d at 373.
318 Old § 36 provided that upon a Commission showing of a defendant's gross
abuse of trust, the defendant could be barred for any length of time, even permanently,
from acting in any capacity in which he committed a breach. Section 36(a) contains a
similar provision and adds "[the court may] award such injunctive or other relief
against such person as may be reasonable and appropriate . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
35(a) (1970). This change in relief allowable, not relevant to any implied private
right of action under §36(a), may produce the greatest new source of enforcement
action against directors and advisers. As noted, the extremeness of old § 36's remedy
was one reason for the infrequent use of the statute. Text accompanying notes 46,
47 supra. The change will eliminate any such psychological impediments. Commis-
sion enforcement proceedings may also prove to be very costly for defendants. A
recent decision, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpher Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971),
petition for cert. filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3095 (U.S. Sept. 3, 1971) (No. 327), indicates
that money payments by securities law violators are within the scope of "other relief."
See Note, Ancillary Relief in SEC Injunction Suits for Violation of Rule 10b-5,
79 Hagv. L. REv. 656 (1966).
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An argument could be advanced, however, that congressional
creation of an express private right of action in section 36(b) negates
the existence of an implied private right of action in section 36(a). If
the two sections are considered complementary, this argument might be
superficially appealing. A motive to clarify the state of the law under
section 36 and delineate exactly the extent to which private rights of
action were to be recognized under federal law could be imputed to
Congress, allowing both shareholder and Commission enforcement of
the duty with respect to compensation, while giving solely to the Com-
mission the authority to police instances of personal misconduct with
respect to the fiduciary duty owed the fund by the adviser. But neither
a consideration of the legislative history of the Investment Company
Amendments Act of 1970 nor an analysis of the relationship of section
36(a) to section 36(b) will support such a result.
The legislative history of all the various bills that figured in the
creation of the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 .. con-
tains no explicit references to the status of implied rights of action
under section 36. The mutual fund industry appears to have been pre-
occupied with changing the standard relating to fees under section
36(b), and no correlation between the revision of section 36 and the
addition of section 36(b) was perceived."2 0 The underlying purpose of
the section 36(b) addition was to take specific steps to ensure that
advisory fees were subject to more judicial scrutiny than was pre-
viously the case under either state law or an implied right of action
under former section 36.1 According to the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency,
we have added a new section 36(b) to the Investment Com-
pany Act to specify that the adviser has a fiduciary duty with
respect to [the advisory fee] . . 122
The main concern of Congress was to overcome the effect of cases such
as Saxe v. Brady '2' on mutual fund advisory fee litigation. This
concern is illustrated by the following exchange among Senate Com-
mittee Chairman John Sparkman, Philip Loomis, the Commission
General Counsel, and Hugh Owens, a Commission Commissioner:
[The Committee Chairman]: Does this standard [of cor-
porate waste in Saxe v. Brady] effectively preclude any
119 See 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 9.
120 E.g., compare 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 69, at 88-90, with id. 92
(Statements of Robert Augenblick, President, Investment Company Institute).
121 This appears to have been the understanding of the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit. See Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 373 n.7 (1st Cir. 1971), petition
for cert. filed sub nora. Johnson v. Moses, 40 U.S.L.W. 3095 (U.S. Sept. 1, 1971)
(No. 319).
122 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 6.
123 40 Del. Ch. 474, 184 A.2d 602 (Ch. 1962).
124 The effect of Saxe on federal advisory fee litigation is illustrated by Acampora
v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527, 548-49 (D. Colo. 1963).
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mutual funds shareholder from suing in court in order to
reduce the management fee?
[Mr. Loomis] : It has so far. No shareholder has success-
fully recovered in suits on management fees.
[The Committee Chairman] : Is it not true that under the pro-
visions of this legislation all that is being done is to allow
the mutual fund shareholder the right to have some deter-
mination made by disinterested bodies-that is the Federal
courts-as to the reasonableness of the fee?
[Mr. Owens]: Mr. Chairman, that is the way we view it and
that is the way we recommend it.'
Therefore, the placing of the desired remedial provision in new section
36 in no way was intended to adversely reflect upon an implied right
of action under former section 36 or new section 36(a). Section 36(b)
is a Congressional reaction to a specific problem of mutual fund share-
holders in an area of recently greater importance.
The overall failure to mention explicitly private rights of action
other than under section 36(b) may well reflect a cautious approach
on the part of the Commission, Congress, and the mutual fund industry.
Although such a right seems firmly established in the law, the existence
of one contrary holding and the absence of a definitive Supreme Court
decision leave enough uncertainty that none of those involved may have
wished to publicly dispute the merits of the proposition. In effect,
private rights of action for other than excess compensation were to be
left to develop in the courts. Of the two references made to private
rights of action by the Congress, one professes neutrality while the
other acknowledges the existence of the action. The former, in the
1969 Senate Report on S. 2224,-126 a predecessor bill, declared that:
Although section 36(b) provides for an equitable action
for breach of fiduciary duty as does section 36(a), the fact
that subsection (b) specifically provides for a private right of
action should not be read by implication to affect sub-
section (a).'2
The latter, of even more far-reaching importance in discerning Con-
gress' understanding of the state of the law, is a statement in the 1970
1251969 Senate Hearings, supra note 69, at 20; see id. 153 (Statement of Pro-
fessor Ernest Folk, University of Virginia Law School) :
We have had some very restrictive decisions here primarily turning upon
the burden and quantum of proof. It appears to me that the new proposal
would go a good deal of the way . . . toward undoing some of these
restrictive provisions.
126 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
127 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 16.
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Report on a version of the amendments act by the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce..2 8 In the context of explaining why
prior circumstances required a change in the law, the Committee noted
that :
Under existing provisions of the [1940 Act], a fund
shareholder can challenge the investment advisory fee by a
suit under section 36 of the Act alleging gross misconduct or
a gross abuse of trust on the part of the fund directors in
agreeing to the management fee. This procedure has proven
to be cumbersome for plaintiffs-'
2 9
Thus, at a minimum, congressional enactment of section 36(b)
should not imply that no other private rights of action were to be
allowed under section 36(a) for breaches of a fiduciary duty. The only
references in the legislative history are an acknowledgment of the
judicial development of a private right of action and an intention to
avoid affecting its future course. Such a conclusion is reinforced by
the anomalous results of a contrary assumption, which would allow a
mutual fund shareholder to seek judicial relief from sophisticated man-
agerial abuses in the form of complex compensation agreements, but
would prevent recovery for other managerial abuse unless it was so
flagrant as to be a violation of state law.
B. The Impact of Section 36(a)
The continued existence of an implied private right of action under
section 36(a) should have a broad impact on dealings between a mutual
fund and its investment adviser. Section 36(a) will be a useful tool in
reducing adviser abuse because it changes the standard from one of
gross abuse of trust to one of breach of fiduciary duty. This change in
standard, when enforced by shareholder suits, should lead to a recon-
sideration of the roles of the investment adviser and the mutual fund
directors in situations in which the mutual fund's interests are involved.
The aim of Congress and the Commission in changing the standard
of section 36(a) was to overcome the psychological impact on courts of
the gross misconduct standard.' 0 Prior judicial interpretation had
concluded that this standard involved a fiduciary concept. In Aldred
imv. Trust v. SEC, 8 for example, the First Circuit affirmed the district
court's prohibitory injunction and appointment of a receiver, saying
"[t]he findings of the District Court . . . reveal a course of conduct
that was motivated by self-interest and personal advantage and the
128 1970 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 83.
129Id. 7 (emphasis added). The House Report also contained a disclaimer
similar to the Senate Report's regarding any implications to be drawn about § 36(a)
because of the addition of §36(b). Id. 38.
13o See notes 45-47 supra & accompanying text.
131 151 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946).
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calculated denial of fiduciary obligations." '32 Nevertheless, the statu-
tory formulation in terms of "gross misconduct" has made courts
hesitant to find a violation. As a 1969 report of the Senate Banking
and Currency Committee explained:
The highly punitive overtones of the existing section,
together with the injunctive penalty, seriously impairs the
ability of the courts to deal flexibly and adequately with
wrongdoing by certain affiliated persons of investment com-
panies.
133
Beyond such explanations of motive the legislative history does not
discuss in any detail the desired impact of this change upon actual
situations.13' The conflict of interest problems of the mutual fund
industry,135 however, should clearly come under much closer scrutiny
because of the change.
Section 1 (b) of the 1940 Act 136 speaks directly to the conflict of
interest situation, declaring that it is contrary to the public interest when
investment companies are "operated . . . in the interest of directors,
officers, investment advisers, depositors, or other affiliated persons
thereof, . . . rather than in the interest of . . . such companies'
security holders . ," .. Even before the recent amendments, the
First Circuit had declared that "§ 1 (b) of the [1940] Act . . . in
effect codifies the fiduciary obligations placed upon officers and directors
of investment companies." ' 8  The court, finding that the defendants
had made portfolio transactions to further their own interest and had
thus transgressed section 1(b)'s policy, held they had violated the
standard of duty under section 36.189 Congress, in the Investment
Company Amendments Act of 1970,' ° underscored its awareness that
this facet underlay the problems in the mutual fund industry, by provid-
ing in section 36(a) that a court fashioning relief should do so with
"due regard to the protection of investors and to the effectuation of the
policies declared in section . . . 1(b) of this title." '1' By making
332 Id. at 260 (emphasis added).
33 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 36.
134 The collected legislative history does contain numerous discussions of the
term fiduciary duty, but they are all in connection with the impact of §36(b) upon
investment advisory fees. See notes 70-91 supra & accompanying text.
13 5 See notes 19-24 supra & accompanying text.
3.3615 U.S.C. §80a-1(b) (1970).
237 Id. § 80a-1 (b) (2) (1970).
138 Aldred Inv. Trust v. SEC, 151 F.2d 254, 260 (lst Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 795 (1946); cf. Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 218-19 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd on other grounds, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
139 The defendants obtained control of an investment trust, caused the trust to
purchase a controlling interest in a race track, and then put themselves on the race
track's payroll with generous salaries. 151 F.2d at 260.
140 Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52
(1970)).
14115 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (a) (1970).
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specific reference to this section of the statute, Congress has indicated
that those subject to section 36(a), including the fund's directors and
its investment adviser, breach their fiduciary duty when competing
interests are not resolved in the mutual fund's favor.
The phrase "involving personal misconduct" in section 36(a)
should not be taken by the courts to limit the scope of section 36(a)'s
impact on the adviser, fund directors, or other affiliated persons. The
phrase was inserted when industry representatives voiced the fear that
standing alone, the words "breach of fiduciary duty" would "leave only
the vaguest of standards to guide and control administrative action," 142
and allow the Commission to seek judicial action in situations involving
only a difference of opinion over day-to-day business judgment.'
41
Concern was voiced subsequently by Professor Folk that "the inclusion
of this phrase . . .could go a long way in the direction of returning
section 36 to being the virtually useless provision that it is under the
present statute." '" The fear was that "some lawyer could well argue
that because his man [just] sat there . . . and didn't open his big
mouth, that he wasn't guilty of misconduct." 15 The response of Con-
gress to Professor Folk's concern indicates that such a conclusion
would not comport with the legislature's intent. The 1970 Report of
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, in its
section-by-section analysis of the amendments bill, declared:
This section is intended to deal only with such violations
committed by individuals. . . [Y] our committee does not in-
tend to limit . . . this section to situations where an actual
intent to violate the law can be shown or to acts of affirmative
misconduct. In appropriate cases, nonfeasance of duty or
abdication of responsibility would constitute a breach of
fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct. 4
In this regard, the statement of the Supreme Court in Pepper v.
Litton 1' is most appropriate:
He [who is in a fiduciary position] cannot use his power for
his personal advantage and to the detriment of the stock-
holders . . .no matter how absolute in terms that power may
142 1969 Senate Hearings, supra note 69, at 92 (Statement of Robert Augenblick,
President, Investment Company Institute).
143 See id. 100-01 (Additional Statement of the Investment Company Institute).
1
4 4 Id. 155 (Statement of Professor Ernest Folk, University of Virginia Law
School).
145Id. 157 (Statement of Senator McIntyre).
146 1970 Housn REPORT, supra note 83, at 37. This echoes the sentiments of a
prior Senate Report that explained adding the "personal misconduct" phrase to a
bill as "meeting the principal objection that section 36 should not be a general
authorization for unspecified regulatory actions." 1968 SENATE REPoRT, supra note
29, at 11.
147 308 U.S. 295 (1939) (holding that a controlling stockholder had a fiduciary
duty to the corporation that was enforceable by a trustee in bankruptcy).
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be and no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy technical
requirementsY48
Thus, the present stance of section 36(a) appears as a stringent
requirement that advisers, to avoid attack in the courts, now take im-
mediate measures to ensure that the mutual funds do not suffer because
of their dominance of those funds. Additionally, directors and officers
of the mutual fund are subject to the fiduciary standard, 49 and section
36(a) should serve as a firm incentive for such persons to actively work
on behalf of the mutual fund's interest. 5 ° The lack of specificity in the
standard, rather than being a drawback, is valuable in that the courts
have a flexible tool to use in controlling mutual fund abuse.
The nature of the duties owed a fund becomes clearer when the
numerous opportunities for mutual fund abuse by the investment ad-
viser are considered. 5' Conflict over the proper uses of mutual fund
brokerage is illustrative. Either affirmative approval of an adviser-
benefiting scheme of allocation or failure to inquire into the potential
uses of this fund "asset" to benefit the mutual fund should fall into the
category of a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct. 52
In an industry where "self-dealing is not the exception but, so far as
management is concerned, the order of the day," 13 wide enforcement
by shareholders of a broad standard of fiduciary duty owed the mutual
fund is a necessary prophylactic to insure that the mutual fund and,
through it, the shareholders, are treated fairly by those in control.
CONCLUSION
New section 36 represents the congressional response to a series
of reports and studies that indicated that changes were needed in the
scheme of regulation devised for mutual funds. The structural nature
of mutual funds had always led to situations in which self-dealing was
possible, and the rapid growth of the funds, in both number of share-
holders and asset size, made the actual instances of abuse much more
visible. Neither federal nor state law was equipped to deal with the
problems. The new law presents a two-pronged approach. Section
36(b) imposes a fiduciary duty upon those receiving payments for
14'Id. at 311 (emphasis added).
149 15 U.S.C. §35(a) (1) (1970).
150 In the compensation area, this duty will buttress the director's affirmative
duty to evaluate the advisory contract. See note 24 supra.
151 See text accompanying notes 30, 31 supra.
152A recently decided case brought under old § 36, Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d
369 (1st Cir. 1971), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Johnson v. Moses, 40 U.S.L.W.
3095 (U.S. Sept. 1, 1971) (No. 319), held that it was a gross abuse of trust by
the investment adviser to fail to inform the unaffiliated directors of potential methods
of recapturing fund-generated brokerage commissions. Such a decision under the
gross abuse standard augurs well for forward-looking judicial interpretations of the
newer and broader standard of fiduciary duty.
153 Id. at 376.
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services from a mutual fund. Either the Commission or a shareholder
may invoke it, and its aim is essentially to have investment advisory
fees set at a reasonable level. Section 36(a) imposes a fiduciary duty
with respect to personal misconduct on those who control the mutual
fund or are otherwise related to the investment adviser. Whereas
section 36(b) is clear and explicit in its goal, section 36(a) is a much
more flexible provision which, when employed in a private share-
holder's suit, has the potential to be a powerful weapon in combatting
mutual fund abuse. This Comment has discussed the legislative history
of these two new provisions in order to demonstrate that the intent was
that both section 36(a) and section 36(b) be broadly interpreted to
allow greater judicial scrutiny of the mutual fund industry.
